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I once heard Abel Wolman tell a group of engineers that
if they ever got a chance to build a dam, do it! I now
think better advice would be that, if there is ever an
opportunity to privatize a public water function, do it! I
am a bit surprised at times to hear myself say this
because I received my undergraduate education in
natural resources management in an era when the
NAWAPA plan for diverting the waters of the Yukon to
the lower 48 states was presented by at least one natural
resources textbook as a model of water resource
planning. By the time I arrived in Washington in the
1960s NAWAPA was slowly being killed by its obscene
economics as it should have been. I believed that there
was merit in the idea that government could be the
vehicle for developing water resources. This, of course,
was the Progressive Vision, the Gospel of Efficiency, a
viewpoint that had pervaded my education as a
conservationist.
As an economist I was prepared to accept the
Progressive Vision with the caveat that the benefits of a
project should exceed its costs. And I was prepared to
execute the benefit-cost analysis and, in time, to
participate in improving the Water Resource Council's
Principles and Standards. It was a vision that let me feel
at home in Washington in the 1960s but as my
experience accumulated I began to realize that bureaus
responsible for planning water resource developments at
any level of government, while motivated by
professional goals and standards, were ultimately
interested in increasing their reach, or some would say,
their budgets; and the last thing anyone involved wanted
to hear was that the economics of a proposed project
were unfavorable. Something was seriously wrong with
a gospel that trusted professionals, politicians and their
clients with water resources and, with little restraint, the
funds to develop them.
The 1960s were a part of the period Marion Clawson
has called the era of management on the public lands.
In water resources it was the end of the big projects and
basin-wide development schemes. In no small part this
was because, as Walter Langbein, hydrologist par
excellence for many years with USGS has pointed out,
the nation had run out of the most efficient dam sites.

This meant that if there ever had been an economically
efficient water resource development project, it had
already been built, perhaps in the preceding century and
probably with private money. Notwithstanding, the
federal government had developed the Colorado, the
Columbia, the Tennessee, the Missouri, the Mississippi,
and numerous smaller basins with questionable
efficiency gains for the nation (but nice gains for local
beneficiaries).
Other circumstances have changed as well. Consider
the situation in 1907 when William Howard Taft could
say with reference to the Grand Valley Project in
Colorado that “there are a good many enterprises that
involve the outlay of capital so large or require so much
risk that it is better that, associated with private
enterprise, the government help, too . . . .” In fact,
private enterprise had tried and failed to bring water to
the Valley. The government project ended up costing
far more than was estimated because of the same
engineering difficulties that had defeated the private
efforts.
Now consider whether a President could make such a
claim today about water resource projects when there
are many firms of a size that can and do take on large
and risky projects, if there is a positive expected payout.
As evidence, there are reports that Enron, a private firm,
is approaching cities along the Rio Grande offering to
manage regional water plans and provide water supplies
without taking irrigated land out of production. What
Taft should have said, perhaps, and which would surely
be echoed today, is that “there are a good many
enterprises so bad that only government is willing to
undertake them and there is almost no limit to the size
of a private undertaking, properly conceived and
financed.” None of the classic rationale for public
involvement in water holds much water any longer, if it
ever did.
As an efficiency advocate, I would prefer to see private
firms take a much larger hand in dealing with our water
resource problems. The more I have seen of the bad
economics in water resource undertakings at any level
of government, the more firmly I have become
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engineering monuments like dams and interbasin
diversions are preferred to more cost effective
alternatives like tightening up the efficiency of their
systems and of users' behavior.

convinced of the importance of economic efficiency.
Unless we insist on economically efficient projects, i.e.,
with benefits greater than costs, we waste funds. The
more an economy puts its funds into inefficient projects,
the less national output grows until at some point
national output will decline. Autocratic and socialist
governments typically engage in such “transactions of
decline.”
The idea behind privatization is that an organization
whose bottom line is seeing that costs do not exceed
revenues is driven to be efficient. Compare this with
the incentives found in an organization that lives with
the promise of an ever increasing budget, if they can
demonstrate the ability to spend their current budget.
The Corps of Engineers and the U.S. Forest service are
examples of organizations that live by the perverse
incentives of ever increasing budgets. To the Forest
Service the payoff has been from road building and
timber sales whose costs exceed revenues. The more
roads they could build and the more timber they could
sell, the more Congress rewarded them with increased
budgets. The Forest Service has not been constrained
by a need to demonstrate that benefits exceed costs.
(For more on the Forest Service check out
<http://www.ti.org>)
The Corps of Engineers is driven to expand the public
works budget. They have been constrained by the
formality of demonstrating that the benefits of a
proposed project are not exceeded by project costs. The
challenge to the Corps has been to work around the
formal constraint. This they have done in a variety of
ways, none more clearly demonstrated than the recent
case of waterway improvements in the upper
Mississippi in which the Corps managers have been
shown blatantly to be manipulating the benefit-cost
models to turn a veritable pig's ear into a silk purse.
The bottom line for the Corps as stressed in internal
memoranda was increasing the budget. (Read the
affidavit by Donald Sweeney, a Corps economist, at
<http://www.environmentaldefense.org>.)
Municipal water departments would appear on the
surface to be driven by efficiency because they depend
on revenues from customers. Beginning at least with
Hirshleifer, deHaven, and Milliman (1960), study after
study has exposed water departments to be models of
inefficiency. They have been shown to tolerate leaky
distribution systems. They refuse to meter water to
customers. They ignore the price elasticity of demand
for water. They blithely underprice water at the margin
in the belief that expanding use will generate political
support for expanding supplies.
Temporary and
infrequent shortages imposed by drought, though
economically justified, are unthinkable.
Flashy
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Water departments have been able to get by with
inefficiencies that the private market would not tolerate
because they operate as public agencies or as public
utilities with guarantees that revenues from all sources,
including tax subsidies, will meet their costs. The tax
subsidies include direct subventions from the local tax
base and the ability to float tax-free bonds. The
subsidies include assistance from the federal
government in the form of “multiple purpose” reservoirs
built by the federal water resource agencies that can
spread some of the costs of water supply among other
project purposes. We can give credit to municipal
beneficiaries for repaying their share of the costs with
interest but we dare not look too closely at the rates of
interest they are charged. In contrast, flood control,
recreation, and navigation beneficiaries don't directly
repay costs and irrigation does not repay the interest
costs. And the rules for benefit-cost analysis do require
that the value of the municipal water supplies
contributed must exceed the federal costs (except in the
case of communities under 10,000 population – no
small loophole). The federal benefit-cost rules also
impose on the planners the requirement of showing that
there are no more cost-effective solutions for increasing
water supplies than building structures.
For many years into my career I believed that systems
analysis and economic rationality properly applied
could correct the inefficiencies shown to exist in water
supply practice.
Systems analysis and economic
reasoning enabled us at Resources for the Future in the
1960s to show that there were many superior
alternatives to the Corps of Engineers plan for 16 major
dams in the Potomac basin, if costs alone were the
criterion and maintenance of dissolved oxygen in the
estuary was the objective of planning (Davis, 1968).
Later, Steve Hanke and I were able to show that given
the ability to price water seasonally at its marginal costs,
the multiplepurpose water storage projects were an
unneeded solution for the Washington, D.C. water
supply problems.
Daniel Sheer, an independent
consultant and Bob McGarry, the head of the
Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission were able
in the 1980s, together with the local water suppliers and
some astute analysts, to put into place a water supply
plan for the Washington, D.C. area that depended
heavily on systems analysis, pricing, sensible risk
management, and a minimum of additional water
storage and emergency water treatment facilities.
(McGarry, 1983).

The sad truth is that we in the public sector or any
political bureaucracy resist innovative ideas that
improve efficiency if those ideas represent a change in
the way we think about problems, if they require
changes
in
behavioral
patterns
of
the
institutions/agencies concerned, and if incentives for the
managers don't change. I think we have learned that the
water users, because they face economic incentives in
the form of payments for their water, are much more
responsive to cost saving ideas than are the managers,
because the managers operate with a set of incentives
that have more to do with the size of their budgets and
maintaining the status quo than with the efficiency of
their performance.

political leash. This will be unfortunate because
without marginal cost pricing, the true worth of water
supply to the users cannot be known and overbuilding
will be the consequence.

I do not believe the future is black. Our engineers and
managers are competent, if perversely challenged.
Municipal governments have learned to privatize
functions through contracting and franchising. There
are private water companies with long records of
efficient service. A committee appointed by the
National Research Council is currently studying the
pros and cons of private municipal water services. As
long as a company like Enron sees opportunities to
compete with the public agencies in solving water
It should be indisputable that the solution adopted for supply problems, there is hope. It is necessary,
Washington, D.C.'s water supply problems was one of however, for us to be willing to allow competition from
those innovations that improve efficiency. While I was new ideas and new entrants into the field of providing
teaching at the Ohio State University about ten years water services.
ago I gave an invited public lecture on municipal water
supply management in which I extolled the virtues of
efficient solutions in general and of the Washington, Robert K. Davis, fresh out of Harvard with a Ph. D. in
D.C. water supply plan in particular. At this time a local economics, entered the water field because RFF wanted
water department was going all out on a plan for more a new gun to perform a systems analysis of the Corps of
water storage to meet projected demands and stubbornly Engineers 1962 plan for developing the water resources
resisting suggestions for adjusting water rates to reflect of the Potomac River Basin. There followed a career of
marginal costs, for projecting demands with realistic analyzing many other plans for channelization,
sensitivity to prices, for drought emergency planning irrigation, municipal and industrial water supply as an
with water conservation measures. The game was so employee of national and international organizations
serious that some prominent efficiency advocates and the U.S. Department of Interior. He has taught,
written, and lectured on water resource economics.
received subtle threats.
Currently he serves on a National Research Council
From the Ohio experience I went to a developing committee charged with evaluating the state of
country where a water supply plan had to be evaluated. ecosystem science for managing the Missouri River.
We found that the department in charge of the study For the past 10 years he has been affiliated with the
wanted dams. They had forbidden the consultants Institute of Behavioral Sciences, University of Colorado
charged with the engineering studies to investigate the at Boulder.
feasibility of pumping groundwater, which has since
proven to be the superior alternative. From that point
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from charging its customers the long-run cost of water
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